

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION(S)

POLI 315 | FALL 2017

DR. THIBAUD HENIN / THIBAUD.HENIN@CONCORDIA.CA / H 1225-40
OFFICE HOURS: T, 14:00-16:00; M & W, 10:45-11:45; & BY APPOINTMENT

MB S2.115 / FRIDAYS, 13:15-16:00

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COURSE OVERVIEW

The focus of this course is on how international relations are organized. Although the international system is (most often) characterized as anarchy, in many issue areas, national governments, and sometimes non-state actors (e.g. non-governmental organizations and corporations), appear to work together in pursuit of mutually beneficial outcomes. This course explores the organizations that structure these relations and how they provide (or fail to provide) global governance. Over the span of thirteen weeks, it addresses several questions, such as:

- Why do international organizations exist?
- Why types of issues do they address and why?
- How does the structure of issues affect the design of these organizations?
- How do these organizations exert influence?
- What factors determine whether these organizations are effective (i.e. successful or not successful) and how can we assess this?

We will discuss principal theoretical perspectives and use them to examine security, economic, human rights and environmental organizations. The goal of this course is not to describe the UN or international organizations, but to help students structure their understanding of how they shape international relations. As such, the emphasis is not on memorization, but developing critical thinking.

EXPECTED LEARNING OUTCOMES

By the end of this course, successful students will have demonstrated the ability to:

- Identify and evaluate competing explanations on (a) why governments, NGOs and firms create or participate in international/transnational organizations, and (b) what determines the design of organizations.
- Evaluate whether an international organization has been effective.
- Compare several prominent organizations with respect to their structures, functions and activities.
- Use core vocabulary and concepts related to international organizations and global governance.
- Write compelling argumentative papers analyzing international organizations and summarizing predominant literature.
- Demonstrate critical thinking by assess theoretical claims about the design and effectiveness of international institutions.

TEACHING PHILOSOPHY

We are all responsible for contributing to each other's learning experience. This course is designed to foster on-going learning. As such, students are expected to have read and thought about the material before attending class. To encourage this, I incorporate small 'journal' assignments and quizzes. These are designed to be short and effective – if you've been doing the readings and attending class, they should be relatively easy.

Recognizing that sometimes people have a bad week or may struggle with some of the material, flexibility is built into the assignment schedule. Although all are mandatory, only your best ones will count towards your grade.

Students that are willing to put in a few hours a week into the course usually do well. Rather than having to 'cram' at the

last minute to study for an exam or write a paper, on-going learning requires a continual commitment.

REQUIREMENTS

The major outputs of this course are:

35 %	Quizzes (Best 9 of 10)
20 %	Journal Reflection Responses (Best 12 of 13)
25 %	Writing Assignments
20 %	Final Exam

MAKEUP QUIZZES AND LATE JOURNAL POLICY

There will be no makeup quizzes; or journals, paper outlines or paper drafts accepted after their respective deadlines. Exceptions may only be granted in extraordinary circumstances, when students provide documentation and receive prior approval at least a week in advance. For final paper submissions, late assignments will be penalized 2.5 % per day and will not be accepted beyond a week past the deadline. **If you run into unforeseen challenges during the semester please speak with me ASAP.** It is easier to work things out before deadlines pass.

QUIZZES

There are ten quizzes. Your best nine will be worth 35 % of your final grade. The quizzes focus exclusively on the content since the last quiz. Some questions are derived from material only discussed in class (and deliberately not included on PowerPoint slides), some from the readings. **The quizzes are designed to reward studiousness and penalize those that do not attend class or complete the readings.**

WRITING ASSIGNMENTS

The writing component of the class consists of two papers. For the first, you must analyze an international organization that addresses an *economic or security issue*, for the second, one that addresses a *human rights or environmental issue*. Each is

worth 12.5 % of your final grade, should consist of around 1500 words (excluding references, quotations, footnotes, works cited) and present a brief argument of (a) why this organization was formed; (b) what determined the design of the organization; and (c) whether this organization was effective at solving the problem it sought to address. Although brief, these papers should present a compelling argument, not just a summary of existing literature.

To assist you in writing excellent papers, for each you must submit an outline (10 % of paper grade), a draft for peer-editing (10 % of paper grade) and final paper (80 %). Here is a breakdown of the deadlines:

- 29 Sept: Paper #1 outline (bring to class)
- 20 Oct: Paper #1 draft for peer-editing (bring to class)
- 27 Oct: Paper #1 submitted (on-line)
- 10 Nov: Paper #2 outline (bring to class)
- 17 Nov: Paper #2 draft for peer-editing (bring to class)
- 24 Nov: Paper #2 submitted (on-line)

JOURNAL RESPONSES

Before each class, students are expected to answer journal prompts to the assigned readings, for a total of 13 responses during the course. Students will be allowed to miss one prompt, without penalty, throughout the term.

Prompts will be provided at least two days prior to the class. Responses should be approximately 1-2 pages, written in an *thin* notebook. These must be brought to every class and will be picked-up and graded at random intervals. Full grade for entries will be given when:

1. The entry provides some indication that the student read the required readings.
2. The student demonstrates that some time was taken for reflection.

FINAL EXAM

Your final exam is worth 20% of your grade. Whereas the quizzes are non-cumulative, the final exam focuses on overarching questions and core concepts of the course.

READINGS

Readings for this course are drawn from online sources and the following two textbooks:

Hurd, I. (2014). *International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice* 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Young, O. R. (1999). *Governance in World Affairs*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

These are available for purchase at the Concordia bookstore and online, and are available on reserve at the library. In addition, any readings from these books assigned during the first two weeks of the course are also provided on Moodle (after which you must have access to the book).

As identified in this syllabus, some texts are provided on Moodle, others are available through the university's subscriptions to journal databases. To access these texts, you have several options. You may (a) use a computer in the library, (b) use your own computer on the university wireless network, or (c) connect to the university network from home using a VPN (<https://www.concordia.ca/it/services/vpn.html>). Students are not responsible for the content of optional readings. However, if you are interested in a topic or pursuing further studies in international relations I encourage you to read these.

The Globe and Mail or *The New York Times*—subscribe to read one of these papers on-line, or get a real paper delivered. Alternatively, consider subscribing to *The Economist* and sign up for its 'Espresso News' service. Be ready to discuss recent articles at the beginning of many classes. You are responsible for knowledge of major current events.

ACADEMIC HONESTY

Don't cheat. Today's technology makes it very easy to catch cheaters. All your assignments will be verified online. Everything in your assignments must be your own work. Neither ignorance of these policies nor the lack of an intention to cheat or plagiarize will be considered a legitimate defense. Raise questions you have with me before problems arise.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE STATEMENT ON PLAGIARISM

The Department of Political Science has **zero tolerance for plagiarism**.

The University defines plagiarism as "The presentation of the work of another person as one's own or without proper acknowledgment." (Concordia Graduate Calendar 2008-2009, page 838). Plagiarism is an academic offence governed by the Code of Conduct (Academic). To find out more about how to avoid plagiarism, see Concordia's website on academic integrity:

<https://www.concordia.ca/students/academic-integrity/plagiarism.html>

What are the consequences of getting caught?

Students caught plagiarizing are subject to the following sanctions:

- a. a written reprimand;
- b. a piece of work be re-submitted;
- c. a failing grade for the piece of work in question or for the course, if applicable;
- d. a failing grade and ineligibility for a supplemental examination or any other evaluative exercise for the course;
- e. the obligation to take and pass courses of up to twenty-four (24) credits in addition to the total number of credits required for the student's program as specified by the Academic Hearing Panel. If the student is registered as an

- Independent student, the sanction will be imposed only if he or she applies and is accepted into a program;
- f. specified community service at the University of up to ten (10) hours per week for a specified period of time;
- g. a suspension for a period not to exceed six (6) academic terms. Suspensions shall entail the withdrawal of all University privileges, including the right to enter and be upon University premises;
- h. Expulsion from the University. Expulsion entails the permanent termination of all University privileges. (Graduate Calendar, pp. 838-839).

See also The Political Science Department's "Resources on Avoiding Plagiarism" at:

http://alcor.concordia.ca/~mlipson/01Plagiarism_Home.html

ACCESSIBILITY

The University of Concordia is working to create inclusive learning environments. Please notify me if there are aspects of the instruction or design of this course that result in disability-related barriers to your participation. You are also encouraged to contact the [Access Centre for Students with Disabilities \(ACSD\)](#) as soon as possible so that this office can assist with the necessary accommodations.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

As a professor, one of my responsibilities is to help create a safe learning environment for my students and for the campus as a whole. If you have experienced sexual harassment, sexual violence or discrimination, Concordia's Sexual Assault Resource Centre provides information available resources:

<https://www.concordia.ca/students/sexual-assault.html>

CHANGES TO THE SYLLABUS

I reserve the right to amend the schedule of meetings and assignments listed in this syllabus as might become necessary based on events throughout the semester. Any changes to the

syllabus will be announced and the most up to date syllabus can be found on Moodle.

READING SCHEDULE

WEEK 1: INTRODUCTION (8 SEPT)

Decision on Week 5 (in class)

Hurd, Ch. 1 (textbook and online), pp. 1-13.

Young, Ch. 1 (textbook and online), pp. 1-23.

Patrick, S. (2014). The unruly world: The case for good enough global governance. *Foreign Affairs* 93(1), 58-73.
<http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora93&sent=1&collection=journals&id=87>

Optional

Krasner, S. (1982). Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. *International Organization*, 36(2), 185-205.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706520>

WEEK 2: DO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS MATTER? (15 SEPT)

Quiz #1

Hurd, Ch. 2 (textbook and online), pp. 15-37.

"How Global Should Government Be?" Essays by Drezner, Florini, Rabkin, and Raustiala (four essays, and conversation)
<https://www.cato-unbound.org/issues/june-2007/how-global-should-government-be>

Optional

Mearsheimer, J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security*, 19(3), 5-49. <http://0-www.jstor.org/mercury.concordia.ca/stable/2539078>

Keohane, R., & Martin, L. (1995). The Promise of Institutional Theory. *International Security*, 20(1), 39-51.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539214>

Keohane, R. (1998). International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work? *Foreign Policy*, (110), 82-194.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149278>

Keohane, R. (1988). International Institutions: Two Approaches. *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(4), 379-396.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600589>

WEEK 3: WHY CREATE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS? (22 SEPT)

Quiz #2

Young, Ch. 3 & 2 (textbook), pp. 50-78, then 24-50.

Holmes, K. (2010). "Smart Multilateralism and the United Nations". <http://www.heritage.org/report/smart-multilateralism-and-the-united-nations>

Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization*, 53(4), 699-732.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601307>

Optional

Stein, A. (1982). Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. *International Organization*, 36(2), 299-324.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706524>

Koremenos, Barbara, et al. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization*, vol. 55, no. 4, 2001, pp. 761-799. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078615>

Nielson, D., & Tierney, M. (2003). Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *International Organization*, 57(2), 241-276.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3594852>

Johnston, A. (2001). Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. *International Studies Quarterly*, 45(4), 487-515.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3096058>

WEEK 4: THE UNITED NATIONS (29 SEPT)

Paper #1 outline (bring to class)

Quiz #3

Hurd, Ch. 5 (textbook), pp. 101-125.

Mazower, M. (2004). The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950. *The Historical Journal*, 47(2), 379-398.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X04003723>

"Thinking the Unthinkable." *The Economist*, Nov 11, 2010.
<http://www.economist.com/node/17463443>

Browse: <http://www.un.org/en/about-un/>

Optional

Puchala, D. (2005). World Hegemony and the United Nations. *International Studies Review*, 7(4), 571-584.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/369967>

Johnstone, I. (2003). The Role of the UN Secretary-General: The Power of Persuasion Based on Law. *Global Governance*, 9(4), 441-458. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800496>

WEEK 5: TO BE DETERMINED (6 OCT)

Students vote in week 1 whether to have quiz on this day or replace class with assignment / field trips.

WEEK 6: SECURITY: PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (13 OCT)

Quiz #4

Hurd, Ch. 6 (textbook), pp. 136-164.

Doyle, M., & Sambanis, N. (2007). The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations. *International Journal*, 62(3), 494-518. <http://0-www.jstor.org/mercury.concordia.ca/stable/40184857>

Carvajal, D. (2010). "A Female Approach to Peacekeeping" *New York Times* March 5, 2010. <https://nyti.ms/2l9fJQ7>

Rieff, D. (2011). "The Saints Go Marching In" <http://nationalinterest.org/article/saints-go-marching-5442?page=2>

Browse:

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/>

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf>

Optional

Hultman, L., Kathman, J., & Shannon, M. (2013). United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(4), 875-891. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23496662>

Stephen M. Saideman, David P. Auerswald; Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO's Mission in Afghanistan, *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 56, Issue 1, 1 March 2012, Pages 67–84, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00700.x>

Barany, Z., & Rauchhaus, R. (2011). Explaining NATO's Resilience: Is International Relations Theory Useful?. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 32(2), 286-307. <http://0-dx.doi.org/mercury.concordia.ca/10.1080/13523260.2011.590355>

WEEK 7: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: TRADE (20 OCT)

Paper #1 draft for peer-editing (bring to class)

Quiz #5

Hurd, Ch. 3 (textbook), pp. 41-66

Kucik, J., & Reinhardt, E. (2008). Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime. *International Organization*, 62(3), 477-505. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40071901>

Elsig, M., & Pollack, M. A. (2014). Agents, trustees, and international courts: The politics of judicial appointment at the World Trade Organization. *European Journal of International Relations*, 20(2), 391-415. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066112448201>

Subramanian, A., & Wei, S. J. (2007). The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly. *Journal of International Economics*, 72(1), 151-175. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.07.007>

Optional

Rose, A. K. (2004). Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? *American Economic Review*, 94(1):98–114. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3592771>

Tomz, M., Goldstein, J. L., and Rivers, D. (2007). Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment. *American Economic Review*, 97(5):2005–2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034597>

Goldstein, J., Rivers, D., & Tomz, M. (2007). Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. *International Organization*, 61(1), 37-67. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4498137>

Drezner, D. W. (2014). The system worked: Global economic governance during the great recession. *World Politics*, 66(1), 123-164. <http://0-muse.jhu.edu/mercury.concordia.ca/article/535446>

WEEK 8: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (27 OCT)

Paper #1 submitted (on-line)

Quiz #6

Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1999). Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics. *International Social Science Journal*, 51(159), 89-101. <http://rdcu.be/u7zM/>

Bexell, M., Tallberg, J., & Uhlin, A. (2010). Democracy in Global Governance: The Promises and Pitfalls of Transnational Actors. *Global Governance*, 16(1), 81-101. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800790>

Pallas, C. L., & Urpelainen, J. (2012). NGO monitoring and the legitimacy of international cooperation: A strategic analysis. *The Review of International Organizations*, 7(1), 1-32. <http://rdcu.be/u7zU>

Carpenter, C., Duygulu, S., Montgomery, A. H., & Rapp, A. (2014). Explaining the advocacy agenda: Insights from the

human security network. *International Organization*, 68(2), 449-470. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S00208183130004531>

Optional

Bräutigam, D., & Segarra, M. (2007). Difficult Partnerships: The World Bank, States, and NGOs. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 49(4), 149-181. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30130827>

Ole Jacob Sending, & Neumann, I. (2006). Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States, and Power. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(3), 651-672. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092797>

WEEK 9: HUMAN RIGHTS (3 NOV)

Quiz #7

Hurd, Ch. 9 (textbook), pp.

Kim, D. (2013). International Nongovernmental Organizations and the Global Diffusion of National Human Rights Institutions. *International Organization*, 67(3), 505-539. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000131>

Murdie, A. (2009). The impact of human rights NGO activity on human right practices. *International NGO Journal*, 4(10), 421-440. http://www.academicjournals.org/article/article1381741454_Murdie.pdf

Simmons, B. A. (2014). The future of the human rights movement. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 28(2), 183-196. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679414000227>

Optional

Pogge, Thomas. "World Poverty and Human Rights." *Ethics & International Affairs* 19, no. 1 (2005): 1-7. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2005.tb00484.x>

Ruggie, J. G. (2014). Global Governance and New Governance Theory: Lessons from Business and Human Rights. *Global Governance*, 20, 5. <http://0-search.ebscohost.com/mercury.concordia.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=94508452&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

WEEK 10: EFFECTIVENESS (10 NOV)

Paper #2 outline (bring to class)

Quiz #8

Neumayer, E. (2005). Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights? *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(6), 925-953. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30045143>

Young, Ch. 4 & 5 (textbook), pp. 79-130.

Mitchell, R. B. 2010. *International Politics and the Environment* (ch. 6). London: Sage Publications. On Moodle

Lall, R. (2017). Beyond Institutional Design: Explaining the Performance of International Organizations. *International Organization*, 71(2), 245-280. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818317000066>

Optional

Hovi, Jon, Detlef F. Sprinz, and Arild Underdal. "The Oslo-Potsdam solution to measuring regime effectiveness: Critique, response, and the road ahead." *Global Environmental Politics* 3.3 (2003): 74-96. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/47475>

Gutner, T., & Thompson, A. (2010). The politics of IO performance: A framework. *The review of international organizations*, 5(3), 227-248. <http://rdcu.be/u8xJ>

Young, O. R. (2011). Effectiveness of international environmental regimes: Existing knowledge, cutting-edge themes, and research strategies. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 108(50), 19853-19860. <http://www.pnas.org/content/108/50/19853.full>

WEEK 11: ENVIRONMENT (17 NOV)

Paper #2 draft for peer-editing (bring to class)

Quiz #9

Young, Ch. 6 (textbook), pp. 133-162.

Biermann, F., & Pattberg, P. (2008). Global environmental governance: Taking stock, moving forward. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 33, 277-294. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.enviro.33.050707.085733>

Böhmelt, T., Koubi, V. and Bernauer, T. (2014), Civil society participation in global governance: Insights from climate politics. *Eur J Polit Res*, 53: 18–36. <http://rdcu.be/u8wL/>

Abbott, K. W.; Snidal, D. (2009). Strengthening international regulation through transmittal new governance: Overcoming the orchestration deficit. *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 42(2), 501-578. http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/vantl42&g_sent=1&collection=journals&id=505

Optional

Subramanian, N. and Urpelainen, J. (2014). Addressing cross-border environmental displacement: when can international treaties help? *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, 14(1):25–46. <http://rdcu.be/u8xb>

Biermann, F. (2000). The case for a world environment organization. *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development*, 42(9), 22-31. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00139150009605762>

Adil Najam, "The Case Against a New International Environmental Organization." *Global Governance* 9(2003):367-84. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800488>

Abbott, Kenneth W., Jessica Green, and Robert O. Keohane. "Organizational ecology and organizational diversity in global governance." *Social Science Research Network (SSRN)* (2014). <https://www.princeton.edu/~rkeohane/publications/Organizational%20Ecology%20and%20Organizational%20Diversity%20in%20Global%20Governance.pdf>

Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-governance Is Possible. *American Political Science Review*, 86(02), 404-417. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1964229>

Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C. B., Norgaard, R. B., & Policansky, D. (1999). *Revisiting the commons: local lessons, global challenges*. *Science*, 284(5412), 278-282. <http://o-science.sciencemag.org.mercury.concordia.ca/content/284/5412/278>

Epstein, Charlotte. "The making of global environmental norms: endangered species protection." *Global Environmental Politics* 6.2 (2006): 32-54. <http://o-muse.jhu.edu.mercury.concordia.ca/article/197433>

Haas, P. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. *International Organization*, 46(1), 1-35. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706951>

WEEK 12: CORPORATIONS (24 NOV)

Paper #2 submitted (on-line)

Quiz #10

Green, J. F. (2017) Transnational delegation in global environmental governance: When do non-state actors govern?. *Regulation & Governance*, <http://rdcu.be/u8xm/>

Berliner, D., & Prakash, A. (2015). "Bluwashing" the firm? Voluntary regulations, program design, and member compliance with the United Nations Global Compact. *Policy Studies Journal*, 43(1), 115-138. <http://rdcu.be/u8xv/>

Vogel, D. (2010). The private regulation of global corporate conduct: Achievements and limitations. *Business & Society*, 49(1), 68-87. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650309343407>

Meckling, J. (2015). Oppose, support, or hedge? Distributional effects, regulatory pressure, and business strategy in environmental politics. *Global Environmental Politics*. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/GLEP_a_00296

Optional

Windsor, D. (2007). Toward a global theory of cross-border and multilevel corporate political activity. *Business & Society*, 46(2), 253-278. <http://dx.doi.org.mercury.concordia.ca/10.1177%2F0007650307301387>

Pattberg, P. (2006). The influence of global business regulation: beyond good corporate conduct. *Business and society review*, 111(3), 241-268. <http://rdcu.be/u8xN/>

Lawton, T., McGuire, S., & Rajwani, T. (2013). Corporate political activity: A literature review and research agenda. *International Journal of Management Reviews*, 15(1), 86-105. <http://rdcu.be/u8xP/>

WEEK 13: FUTURE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (1 DEC)

Hurd, Ch. 11 (textbook), pp. 280-287.

Young, Ch. 8 (textbook), pp. 189-216.

Jentleson, B. W. (2017). Global Governance, the United Nations, and the Challenge of Trumping Trump. *Global Governance*, 23(2), 143-149. <http://o-search.ebscohost.com.mercury.concordia.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=122916030&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

Rudd, Kevin. "UN Reform under the Trump Administration: The Way Ahead." *The Washington Quarterly* 40.1 (2017): 95-107. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302741>

Optional

NPR's Radiolab (December 19, 2013) "Sex, Ducks, and The Founding Feud". <http://www.radiolab.org/story/sex-ducks-and-founding-feud>

FINALS WEEK

Final exam as scheduled on exam calendar see:

<http://www.concordia.ca/students/exams/schedule.html>