

POLI 315 B: International Organization(s)
Syllabus – Winter 2019

Instructor:	Dr. Thibaud Henin thibaud.henin@concordia.ca H 1225-40	Teaching Assistant:	Louis-Phillippe Morneau l_morne@live.concordia.ca H-1225-47
Office:		Office:	
Hours:	Tuesdays 10:30-12:30; Wednesdays 13:30-15:30; & by appointment	Hours:	12:00-13:00, Thursdays

Class Location & Times: MB S1.235 SGW / Mon. & Wed. 16:15-17:30

Course Website: <http://moodle.concordia.ca>

Jump to...

[Course Description](#)

[Expected Learning Outcomes](#)

[Teaching Philosophy](#)

[Correspondence and Office Hours](#)

[Requirements](#)

Lateness Policy

Quizzes

Final Exam

Simulation Assignments

Journal Responses

Final Exam

[Readings](#)

[Academic Honesty](#)

[Accessibility](#)

[Policy on Audio and/or Video Recording of Lectures](#)

[Policy on Distribution of Course Materials](#)

[The Use of Electronic Devices in the Classroom](#)

[Sexual Harassment](#)

[On-Campus Resources for Students](#)

[Changes to the Syllabus](#)

Reading Schedule

Week 1 – Introduction

Week 2 – Actors and Agency

Week 3 – Forming International Organizations

Week 4 – Domestic Politics and International Organizations

Week 5 – The United Nations

Week 6 – Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Week 7 – Peacekeeping Operations

Week 8 – World Trade Organization

Week 9 – Non-Governmental Organizations

Week 10 – Environmental IOs and the Emerging Plastic Pollution Regime

Week 11 – The Effectiveness of International Organizations

Week 12 – Human Rights

Week 13 – Future of Global Governance

Finals Week

Course Description

The focus of this course is on how international relations are organized. Although the international system is (most often) characterized as anarchy, in many issue areas, national governments, and sometimes non-state actors (e.g. non-governmental organizations and corporations), appear to work together in pursuit of mutually beneficial outcomes. This course explores the organizations that structure these relations and how they provide (or fail to provide) global governance. Over the span of thirteen weeks, it addresses several questions, such as:

- Why do international organizations exist?
- What types of issues do they address and why?
- How does the structure of issues affect the design of these organizations?
- How do these organizations exert influence?
- What factors determine whether these organizations are effective (i.e. successful or not successful) and how can we assess this?

We will discuss principal theoretical perspectives and use them to examine security, economic, human rights and environmental organizations. The goal of this course is not to describe the UN or international organizations, but to help students structure their understanding of how they shape international relations. As such, the emphasis is not on memorization, but developing critical thinking.

Expected Learning Outcomes

By the end of this course, successful students will have demonstrated the ability to:

- Identify and evaluate competing explanations on (a) why governments, NGOs and firms create or participate in international/transnational organizations, and (b) what determines the design of organizations.
- Evaluate whether an international organization has been effective.
- Compare several prominent organizations with respect to their structures, functions and activities.
- Use core vocabulary and concepts related to international organizations and global governance.
- Write compelling argumentative papers analyzing international organizations and summarizing predominant literature.
- Demonstrate critical thinking by assessing theoretical claims about the design and effectiveness of international institutions.

Teaching Philosophy

We are all responsible for contributing to each other's learning experience. Rather than structuring the course with exams, it is designed to foster on-going learning. As such, students are expected to have read and thought about the material before attending class. In order to encourage this, I incorporate small 'journal' assignments and quizzes. These are designed to be short and effective – if you've been doing the readings and attending class, they should be relatively easy.

Recognizing that sometimes people have a bad week or may struggle with some of the material, the quizzes and assignments are designed to be flexible. Although all are mandatory, only your best ones will count towards your grade.

Students that are willing to put in a few hours a week into the course usually do well. Rather than having to 'cram' at the last minute to study for an exam or write a paper, on-going learning requires a continual commitment. This means that you cannot miss many classes or 'cram' for major exams.

Correspondence and Office Hours

During the semester, the TA and I are prepared to meet at our offices with all students enrolled in the course.

For questions related to quizzes or journals, students should first contact the TA. For all other questions, including those related to the content of the course, students should contact me.

Students are welcome drop in anytime during office hours, but preference is given to those who sign up on the sheet outside my office door.

To contact me, students may either send a message through Moodle (preferred), or e-mail. Please include your course code in the subject of your e-mail.

NOTE: Please do not reply to course-wide announcements sent through Moodle. I do not receive these e-mails.

Requirements

The major outputs of this course are:

- 25 %** Weekly Quizzes (Best 8 of 9)
- 15 %** Journal Reflection Responses (Best 11 of 12)
- 30 %** Simulation Assignments (3 x 10 % each)
- 30 %** Final Exam

Lateness Policy

Deadlines are final. There will be no makeup quizzes; or journals, or paper outlines accepted after their respective deadlines. Exceptions may only be granted in extraordinary circumstances. Ideally, students should provide documentation and receive prior approval at least a week in advance. For final paper submissions, late assignments will be penalized 2.5 % per day and will not be accepted beyond a week past the deadline. **If you run into unforeseen challenges during the semester, please speak with me ASAP.** It is easier to work things out before deadlines pass.

If you are a parent and (might) require extra accommodations, please speak with me. I'm happy to work with you to ensure you can be successful in the course.

Quizzes

There are nine quizzes. Your best eight will be worth 25 percent of your final grade. The quizzes focus exclusively on the content from the weeks before. Some questions are derived from material only discussed in class (and deliberately not included on PowerPoint slides), some from

the readings. **The quizzes are designed to penalize those that do not attend class nor complete the readings.**

Final Exam

The final Exam is cumulative and worth 30% of your final grade and will be scheduled by the exams office.

Simulation Assignments

We be conducting three simulations throughout the semester, each worth 10% of your grade. For each, you will be assigned partners and a country. Each assignment will be graded on four components:

- Participation in the simulation
- Country profile
- Position paper
- Negotiation strategy

Simulations will be broadly based upon the National Model United Nations (<http://www.nmun.org/>).

More details will follow and will be posted online.

Important dates:

- 6 February: Groups & countries for simulation #1 assigned
- 18 February: Simulation #1 (assignment due)
- 20 February: Groups & countries for simulation #2 assigned
- 11 March: Simulation #2 (assignment due)
- 13 March: Groups & countries for simulation #3 assigned
- 25 March: Simulation #3 (assignment due)

Journal Responses

Before each class, students are expected have answered journal prompts on the assigned readings, for a total of 11 responses during the course. Students will be allowed to miss one prompt, without penalty, throughout the term.

Prompts will be provided at least three days prior to the class. Responses should be approximately 250 words, written in an assigned booklet. Full grade for entries will be given when:

1. The entry provides some indication the student read the required readings.
2. The student demonstrates that some time was taken for reflection.

Final Exam

The final exam is worth 30% of the final grade. Whereas the quizzes are non-cumulative, the exam is cumulative and will focus on overarching questions and core concepts from the course.

Readings

All readings are available online. To access these texts, you have several options. You may (a) use a computer in the library, (b) use your own computer on the university wireless network, or (c) connect to the university network from home using a VPN (<https://www.concordia.ca/it/services/vpn.html>).

Department of Political Science Statement on Plagiarism

The Department has zero tolerance for plagiarism.

1. What is plagiarism? The University defines plagiarism as “the presentation of the work of another person, in whatever form, as one’s own or without proper acknowledgment.” (Concordia Undergraduate Calendar 2017–2018, page 55-56). Plagiarism is an academic offence governed by the Code of Conduct (Academic). To find out more about how to avoid plagiarism, see <http://www.concordia.ca/students/academic-integrity/plagiarism.html>.

2. What are the consequences of getting caught? The Dean may impose the following sanctions on students caught plagiarizing: a. Reprimand the student; b. Direct that a piece of work be resubmitted; c. Direct that the examination be taken anew; d. Enter a grade reduction for the piece of work in question or enter a grade of "0" for the piece of work in question; e. Enter a grade reduction in the course or enter a failing grade for the course; f. Enter a failing grade and ineligibility for a supplemental examination or any other evaluative exercise for the course; g. Impose the obligation to take and pass courses of up to twenty-four (24) credits, as specified by the Dean, in addition to the total number of credits required for the student’s program. If the student is registered as an Independent student, the sanction will be imposed only if he or she applies and is accepted into a program.

An Academic Hearing Panel may impose the following sanctions: a. Any or all of the sanctions listed above; b. Impose a suspension for a period not to exceed six (6) academic terms. Suspensions shall entail the withdrawal of all University privileges, including the right to enter and be upon University premises; c. Expulsion from the University. Expulsion entails the permanent termination of all University privileges. (Undergraduate Calendar, page 56.)

Complete regulations can be found beginning on page 54 of the Undergraduate Calendar or (<http://www.concordia.ca/academics/undergraduate/calendar/current/17-10.html>).

3. See also The Political Science Department's "Resources on Avoiding Plagiarism" at: http://alcor.concordia.ca/~mlipson/01Plagiarism_Home.html

Academic Honesty

Don’t cheat. Today’s technology makes it very easy to catch cheaters. All your assignments will be verified online. Everything in your assignments must be your own work. Neither ignorance of these policies nor the lack of an intention to cheat or plagiarize will be considered a legitimate defense. Raise questions you have with me before problems arise.

Accessibility

The University of Concordia is working to create inclusive learning environments. Please notify me if there are aspects of the instruction or design of this course that result in disability-related barriers to your participation. You are also encouraged to contact the [Access Centre for Students with Disabilities \(ACSD\)](#) as soon as possible so that this office can assist with the necessary accommodations.

Policy on Audio and/or Video Recording of Lectures

Pursuant to [Concordia's Policy on Audio and/or Video Recording of Lectures](#), you may not record lectures without prior written permission, and when granted, you may not distribute these recordings online or through any other medium.

Policy on Distribution of Course Materials

Some lecture slides, notes, or exercises used in this course may be the property of the textbook publisher or other third parties. All other course material, including but not limited to slides developed by the instructor(s), the syllabus, assignments, course notes, course recordings (whether audio or video) and examinations or quizzes are the property of the University or of the individual instructor who developed them. Republishing or redistributing this material, including uploading it to web sites or linking to it through services like iTunes, violates the rights of the copyright holder and is prohibited. **There are civil and criminal penalties for copyright violation. Publishing or redistributing this material in a way that might give others an unfair advantage in this or future courses may subject you to penalties for academic misconduct.**

The Use of Electronic Devices in the Classroom

Studies suggest that compared to taking written notes, using a laptop hinders learning (e.g., [Mueller and Oppenheimer, 2014](#)). Moreover, browsing the internet and using electronic devices during class is distracting. To avoid affecting the learning experience of other students, texting during class is prohibited and students that insist on using laptops must sit in the last row of the room.

Sexual Harassment

As a professor, one of my responsibilities is to help create a safe learning environment for my students and for the campus as a whole. If you have experienced sexual harassment, sexual violence or discrimination, Concordia's Sexual Assault Resource Centre provides information available resources: <https://www.concordia.ca/students/sexual-assault.html>

On-Campus Resources for Students

Student Success Centre (Tutoring, Mentoring, Workshops)

<http://www.concordia.ca/students/success.html>

SGW: [514-848-2424](tel:514-848-2424), ext. 3921

LOY: [514-848-2424](tel:514-848-2424), ext. 3555

Room H-440

Access Centre for Students with Disabilities

<http://www.concordia.ca/students/accessibility.html>

Phone: [514-848-2424](tel:514-848-2424), ext. 3525

Room GM-300

Counseling and Psychological Services

<http://www.concordia.ca/students/counselling.html>

SGW: [514-848-2424](tel:514-848-2424), ext. 3545

LOY: [514-848-2424](tel:514-848-2424), ext. 3555

Room H-440

Sexual Assault Resource Centre

<http://www.concordia.ca/students/sexual-assault.html>

[514-848-2424](tel:514-848-2424) ext. 3461

Room H-645

Changes to the Syllabus

I reserve the right to amend the schedule of meetings and assignments listed in this syllabus as might become necessary based on events throughout the semester. Any changes to the syllabus will be announced and the most up to date syllabus can be found online. All deadlines and due dates are listed in course calendar on Moodle.

Reading Schedule

Week 1 – Introduction

Overview of actors, concepts and history

Readings

Karns, Margaret, Karen Mingst and Kendall Stiles, “The Challenges of Global Governance,” in *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance*, 3rd edition, 2015, pp.1-41. (Moodle)

Allison, G. (2018). The Myth of the Liberal Order. *Foreign Affairs*, 97(4), 124–133.

<http://0-search.ebscohost.com/mercury.concordia.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=131477903&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

Response to Allison 2018: Mazarr, Michael J. "The Real History of the Liberal Order." *Foreign Affairs*. 16 Dec. 2018. Web. 16 Dec. 2018. (Moodle)

Patrick, S. (2014). The unruly world: The case for good enough global governance. *Foreign Affairs* 93(1), 58-73.

http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora93&g_sent=1&collection=journals&id=87

Week 2 – Actors and Agency

Debates on the roles of states, IOs and other actors in global governance

Readings

"How Global Should Government Be?" Essays and Responses by Drezner, Florini, Rabkin, and Raustiala (four essays, and conversation) <https://www.cato-unbound.org/issues/june-2007/how-global-should-government-be>

Mearsheimer, J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security*, 19(3), 5-49. <http://0-www.jstor.org/mercury.concordia.ca/stable/2539078>

Response to Mearsheimer 2018: Keohane, R., & Martin, L. (1995). The Promise of Institutional Theory. *International Security*, 20(1), 39-51. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539214>

Optional:

*IF you are struggling with the academic readings this week, look over Chapter two of: Hurd, I. (2014). *International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice* 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. (Moodle)

Response to Mearsheimer 2018: Kupchan, Charles A., and Clifford A. Kupchan. "The Promise of Collective Security." *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 52-61. doi:10.2307/2539215. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539215>

Response to Mearsheimer 2018: Ruggie, John Gerard. "The False Promise of Realism." *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 62-70. doi:10.2307/2539216. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539216>

Response to Mearsheimer 2018: Wendt, Alexander. "Constructing International Politics." *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 71-81. doi:10.2307/2539217. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539217>

Keohane, R. (1998). International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work? *Foreign Policy*, (110), 82-194. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149278>

Keohane, R. (1988). International Institutions: Two Approaches. *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(4), 379-396. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600589>

Week 3 – Forming International Organizations

Exploring theories on the formation and design of IOs

Readings

Holmes, K. (2010). "Smart Multilateralism and the United Nations".

<http://www.heritage.org/report/smart-multilateralism-and-the-united-nations>

Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization*, 53(4), 699-732.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601307>

Koremenos, Barbara, et al. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization*, vol. 55, no. 4, 2001, pp. 761–799. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078615>

Mitchell, Ronald B. "Problem structure, institutional design, and the relative effectiveness of international environmental agreements." *Global Environmental Politics* 6, no. 3 (2006): 72-89. https://rmitchel.uoregon.edu/sites/rmitchel1.uoregon.edu/files/resume/articles_refereed/2006-GEP.pdf

Optional:

Stein, A. (1982). Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. *International Organization*, 36(2), 299-324. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706524>

Nielson, D., & Tierney, M. (2003). Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *International Organization*, 57(2), 241-276.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3594852>

Johnston, A. (2001). Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. *International Studies Quarterly*, 45(4), 487-515. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3096058>

Week 4 – Domestic Politics and International Organizations

How do state's domestic politics affect IOs?

Readings

Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427-60. <http://0-www.jstor.org.mercury.concordia.ca/stable/2706785>.

www.jstor.org.mercury.concordia.ca/stable/2706785.

Nielson, Daniel L., and Michael J. Tierney. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform." *International Organization* 57, no. 2 (2003): 241-76. <http://0-www.jstor.org.mercury.concordia.ca/stable/3594852>

<http://0-www.jstor.org.mercury.concordia.ca/stable/3594852>

Hooghe, L., Lenz, T. & Marks. "Contested world order: The delegitimation of international governance." *G. Rev Int Organ* (2018). <https://link-springer-com.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/article/10.1007%2Fs11558-018-9334-3>

Mansfield, E., & Milner, H. (2018). The Domestic Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements in Hard Times. *World Trade Review*, 17(3), 371-403.

<https://0-doi-org.mercury.concordia.ca/10.1017/S1474745617000428>

Optional:

Bailey, Michael A., Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. "The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade." *World Politics* 49, no. 3 (1997): 309-38. <http://0-www.jstor.org.mercury.concordia.ca/stable/25054005>

<http://0-www.jstor.org.mercury.concordia.ca/stable/25054005>

Chaudoin, Stephen, Helen V. Milner, and Xun Pang. "International Systems and Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Interactions with Empirical Models in International Relations." *International Organization* 69, no. 2 (2015): 275–309.

<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/international-systems-and-domestic-politics-linking-complex-interactions-with-empirical-models-in-international-relations/44F4C102F8DB4B1B82F318503CD52CCC/share/c267653d2b48ee4ddde3b4a5b9fa0c55d58ca628>

Week 5 – The United Nations

Understanding the history, functions and some of the politics of the United Nations

Readings

Chapter 5: Hurd, I. (2014). *International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice* 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. (Moodle)

Dreher, Axel, Valentin Lang, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland. "Buying votes and international organizations: The dirty work-hypothesis." (2018).

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/185527/1/cesifo1_wp7329.pdf

"Thinking the Unthinkable." *The Economist*, Nov 11, 2010.

<https://search-proquest-com.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/docview/764684231/B35D8F5493FD41FBPQ/6?accountid=10246>

Browse: <http://www.un.org/en/about-un/>

Optional:

Urquhart, B. (2006, Sep). The next secretary-general: How to fill a job with no description. *Foreign Affairs*, 85, 15-22. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/mercury.concordia.ca/10.2307/20032067> Retrieved from <https://0-search-proquest-com.mercury.concordia.ca/docview/214287909?accountid=10246>

Puchala, D. (2005). World Hegemony and the United Nations. *International Studies Review*, 7(4), 571-584. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/369967>

Johnstone, I. (2003). The Role of the UN Secretary-General: The Power of Persuasion Based on Law. *Global Governance*, 9(4), 441-458. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800496>

Week 6 – Nuclear Non-Proliferation

What are the international organizations that comprise the nuclear non-proliferation 'regime'? How did they come about, what issues have they faced and how effective have they been?

Readings

Joseph M. Siracusa & Aiden Warren (2018) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: An Historical Perspective, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 29:1, 3-28.

<https://0-doi-org.mercury.concordia.ca/10.1080/09592296.2017.1420495>

Elisabeth Roehrlich (2016) The Cold War, the developing world, and the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 1953–1957, *Cold War History*, 16:2, 195-212 <https://0-doi-org.mercury.concordia.ca/10.1080/14682745.2015.1129607>

Tarja Cronberg (2017) No EU, no Iran deal: the EU's choice between multilateralism and the transatlantic link, *The Nonproliferation Review*, 24:3-4, 243-259. <https://0-doi-org.mercury.concordia.ca/10.1080/10736700.2018.1432321>

Jeffrey W. Knopf. 2012. "Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation: Examining the Linkage Argument," no. 3: 92. <http://0-search.ebscohost.com.mercury.concordia.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edspmu&AN=edspmu.S1531480412300028&site=eds-live>.

Optional:

Roland Popp (2014) Introduction: Global Order, Cooperation between the Superpowers, and Alliance Politics in the Making of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, *The International History Review*, 36:2, 195-209 <https://0-doi-org.mercury.concordia.ca/10.1080/07075332.2014.899263>

Braun, Chaim, and Christopher F. Chyba. "Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime." *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004): 5-49. <http://0-www.jstor.org.mercury.concordia.ca/stable/4137585>.

Week 7 – Peacekeeping Operations

What are peacekeeping operations, how do they come about, how have they changed over time?

Simulation #1 on Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Readings

Read Chapters VI, VII, VIII of UN Charter <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/>
Browse: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/un_peacekeeping_brochure.pdf
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/infographics>
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate>

Doyle, M., & Sambanis, N. (2007). The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations. *International Journal*, 62(3), 494-518. <http://0-www.jstor.org.mercury.concordia.ca/stable/40184857>

Håvard Hegre, Lisa Hultman, and Håvard Mogleiv Nygård, "Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing Effect of UN Peacekeeping Operations," *The Journal of Politics* 0, no. 0 (-Not available-): 000. <https://0-doi-org.mercury.concordia.ca/10.1086/700203>

Optional:

Carvajal, D. (2010). "A Female Approach to Peacekeeping" *New York Times* March 5, 2010. <https://nyti.ms/2l9fJQ7>

Rieff, D. (2011). "The Saints Go Marching In" <http://nationalinterest.org/article/saints-go-marching-5442?page=2>

Hultman, L., Kathman, J., & Shannon, M. (2013). United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(4), 875-891. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23496662>

Week 8 – World Trade Organization

What is the WTO? How does it operate? What problems does it solve (and create)? Is it effective?

Readings

Crowley, Meredith A. "An introduction to the WTO and GATT." *Economic Perspectives* 4 (2003): 42-57. <https://www.chicagofed.org/~media/publications/economic-perspectives/2003/4qeppart4-pdf.pdf>

Rose, A. K. (2004). Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? *American Economic Review*, 94(1):98–114. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3592771>

Tomz, M., Goldstein, J. L., and Rivers, D. (2007). Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment. *American Economic Review*, 97(5):2005–2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034597>

Drezner, D. W. (2014). The system worked: Global economic governance during the great recession. *World Politics*, 66(1), 123-164. <http://omuse.jhu.edu/mercury.concordia.ca/article/535446>

Optional:

Elsig, M., & Pollack, M. A. (2014). Agents, trustees, and international courts: The politics of judicial appointment at the World Trade Organization. *European Journal of International Relations*, 20(2), 391-415. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066112448201>

Subramanian, A., & Wei, S. J. (2007). The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly. *Journal of International Economics*, 72(1), 151-175. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.07.007>

Kucik, J., & Reinhardt, E. (2008). Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime. *International Organization*, 62(3), 477-505. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40071901>

Goldstein, J., Rivers, D., & Tomz, M. (2007). Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. *International Organization*, 61(1), 37-67. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4498137>

Week 9 – Non-Governmental Organizations

What roles do NGOs have in global governance and how do they interact with IOs?

Simulation #2 on WTO Negotiations

Readings

Tallberg, Jonas, Lisa M. Dellmuth, Hans Agné, and Andreas Duit. "NGO influence in international organizations: Information, access and exchange." *British Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 1 (2018): 213-238. <https://doi-org.mercury.concordia.ca/10.1017/S000712341500037X>

Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1999). Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics. *International Social Science Journal*, 51(159), 89-101. <http://rdcu.be/u7zM/>

Optional:

Bexell, M., Tallberg, J., & Uhlin, A. (2010). Democracy in Global Governance: The Promises and Pitfalls of Transnational Actors. *Global Governance*, 16(1), 81-101.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800790>

Pallas, C. L., & Urpelainen, J. (2012). NGO monitoring and the legitimacy of international cooperation: A strategic analysis. *The Review of International Organizations*, 7(1), 1-32.

<http://rdcu.be/u7zU>

Carpenter, C., Duygulu, S., Montgomery, A. H., & Rapp, A. (2014). Explaining the advocacy agenda: Insights from the human security network. *International Organization*, 68(2), 449-470.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S00208183130004531>

Bräutigam, D., & Segarra, M. (2007). Difficult Partnerships: The World Bank, States, and NGOs. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 49(4), 149-181.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/30130827>

Ole Jacob Sending, & Neumann, I. (2006). Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States, and Power. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(3), 651-672.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092797>

Week 10 – Environmental IOs and the Emerging Plastic Pollution Regime

What type of problem structures and institutional design features are common among environmental IOs? What types of negotiation and enforcement challenges do environmental IOs face?

Readings

Dauvergne, Peter. "Why is the global governance of plastic failing the oceans?." *Global Environmental Change* 51 (2018): 22-31. <https://www-sciencedirect-com.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/science/article/pii/S0959378017314140?via%3Dihub>

Peter Dauvergne (2018) The power of environmental norms: marine plastic pollution and the politics of microbeads, *Environmental Politics*, 27:4, 579-597. <https://doi-org.mercury.concordia.ca/10.1080/09644016.2018.1449090>

Biermann, F., & Pattberg, P. (2008). Global environmental governance: Taking stock, moving forward. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 33, 277-294.

<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.enviro.33.050707.085733>

Abbott, K. W.; Snidal, D. (2009). Strengthening international regulation through transmittal new governance: Overcoming the orchestration deficit. *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 42(2), 501-578.

http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/vantl42&g_sent=1&collection=journals&id=505

Optional:

Böhmelt, T., Koubi, V. and Bernauer, T. (2014), Civil society participation in global governance: Insights from climate politics. *Eur J Polit Res*, 53: 18–36. <http://rdcu.be/u8wL/>

Subramanian, N. and Urpelainen, J. (2014). Addressing cross-border environmental displacement: when can international treaties help? *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, 14(1):25–46. <http://rdcu.be/u8xb>

Biermann, F. (2000). The case for a world environment organization. *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development*, 42(9), 22-31. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00139150009605762>

Adil Najam, “The Case Against a New International Environmental Organization.” *Global Governance* 9(2003):367-84. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800488>

Abbott, Kenneth W., Jessica Green, and Robert O. Keohane. "Organizational ecology and organizational diversity in global governance." *Social Science Research Network (SSRN)* (2014). <https://www.princeton.edu/~rkeohane/publications/Organizational%20Ecology%20and%20Organizational%20Diversity%20in%20Global%20Governance.pdf>

Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-governance Is Possible. *American Political Science Review*, 86(02), 404-417. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1964229>

Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C. B., Norgaard, R. B., & Policansky, D. (1999). *Revisiting the commons: local lessons, global challenges*. *Science*, 284(5412), 278-282. <http://0-science.sciencemag.org.mercury.concordia.ca/content/284/5412/278>

Epstein, Charlotte. "The making of global environmental norms: endangered species protection." *Global Environmental Politics* 6.2 (2006): 32-54. <http://0-muse.jhu.edu.mercury.concordia.ca/article/197433>

Haas, P. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. *International Organization*, 46(1), 1-35. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706951>

Week 11 – The Effectiveness of International Organizations

How do we measure whether an IO has been effective? What conditions affect whether IOs are successful in achieving change?

Simulation #3 on Creating a Plastic Waste Convention

Readings

Young, O. R. (2011). Effectiveness of international environmental regimes: Existing knowledge, cutting-edge themes, and research strategies. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 108(50), 19853-19860. <http://www.pnas.org/content/108/50/19853.full>

Neumayer, E. (2005). Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights? *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(6), 925-953. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30045143>

Optional:

Lall, R. (2017). Beyond Institutional Design: Explaining the Performance of International Organizations. *International Organization*, 71(2), 245-280. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818317000066>

Hovi, Jon, Detlef F. Sprinz, and Arild Underdal. "The Oslo-Potsdam solution to measuring regime effectiveness: Critique, response, and the road ahead." *Global Environmental Politics* 3.3 (2003): 74-96. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/47475>

Gutner, T., & Thompson, A. (2010). The politics of IO performance: A framework. *The review of international organizations*, 5(3), 227-248. <http://rdcu.be/u8xJ>

Week 12 – Human Rights

Are Human Rights IOs effective? What challenges do these organizations face? Why do states participate in these organizations?

Readings

Kim, D. (2013). International Nongovernmental Organizations and the Global Diffusion of National Human Rights Institutions. *International Organization*, 67(3), 505-539. <https://www-jstor-org.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/stable/43282075>

Murdie, A. (2009). The impact of human rights NGO activity on human right practices. *International NGO Journal*, 4(10), 421-440. http://www.academicjournals.org/article/article1381741454_Murdie.pdf

Simmons, B. A. (2014). The future of the human rights movement. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 28(2), 183-196. <http://dx.doi.org.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/10.1017/S0892679414000227>

Optional:

Pogge, Thomas. "World Poverty and Human Rights." *Ethics & International Affairs* 19, no. 1 (2005): 1-7. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2005.tb00484.x>

Ruggie, J. G. (2014). Global Governance and New Governance Theory: Lessons from Business and Human Rights. *Global Governance*, 20, 5. <http://0-search.ebscohost.com.mercury.concordia.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=94508452&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

Week 13 – Future of Global Governance

What does the rise of nationalist parties, Trump, Brexit, China mean for global governance?

Jentleson, B. W. (2017). Global Governance, the United Nations, and the Challenge of Trumping Trump. *Global Governance*, 23(2), 143-149. <https://lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/login?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsearch.proquest.com%2Fdocview%2F1896832780%3Facco>

Rudd, Kevin. "UN Reform under the Trump Administration: The Way Ahead." *The Washington Quarterly* 40.1 (2017): 95-107.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302741>

Optional

NPR's Radiolab (December 19, 2013) "Sex, Ducks, and The Founding Feud".
<http://www.radiolab.org/story/sex-ducks-and-founding-feud>

Finals Week

Final Exam (including Quiz #9) according to exam schedule